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 1 
Cost Performance of Public Infrastructure Projects: The 1 
Nemesis and Nirvana of Change-Orders 2 
 3 
Abstract: The cost performance of a wide range of public sector infrastructure projects completed 4 
by a contractor are analyzed and discussed. Changes-orders after a contract to construct an asset 5 
was signed were, on average, found to contribute to a 23.75% increase in project costs. A positive 6 
association between an increase in change orders and the contractor’s margin was identified. 7 
Taxpayers pay for this additional cost, while those charged with constructing assets are rewarded 8 
with an increase in their margins. As the public sector embraces an era of digitization, there is a 9 
need to improve the integration of design and construction activities and engender collaboration 10 
to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and future-proofed.  The research paper provides 11 
empirical evidence for the public sector to re-consider the processes that are used to deliver their 12 
infrastructure assets so as to reduce the propensity for cost overruns and enable future-proofing to 13 
occur.  14 
 15 
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Introduction 23 
Cost overruns have been and continue to be the bête noire for the public sector in Australia (Love 24 
et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2017a;b); this also is a problem worldwide (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; 25 
Cantarelli et al., 2012; Odeck, 2014). Cantarelli et al. (2012) has revealed that the size of the cost 26 
overrun that can materialize (i.e., from the decision to build to a project’s practical completion) 27 
varies by geographical region. Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2008) has declared that specific types of 28 
transportation infrastructure projects (e.g., rail, roads, and bridges) display similar cost overrun 29 
profiles, irrespective of their geographical location, the technology used, and contractual method 30 
employed in their delivery.   31 
 32 
A significant problem that has been consistently identified as a contributor to increasing an asset’s 33 
construction costs is the quality of the contractual documentation that is produced (e.g., Jarkas, 34 
2014). The errors and omissions that often materialize in contract documentation, for example, 35 
typically do not come to light until construction has commenced, and can therefore result in 36 
change-orders occurring (i.e. additional work and/or rework). Fundamentally, change-orders lead 37 
to unintended consequences; in their basic form this is an increase in project costs for the public-38 
sector client, but for contractors it can result in increased margins. There has been a tendency to 39 
overlook this dynamic, as data is not readily available due to commercial confidentiality. A 40 
change-order is essentially a client’s written instruction (or their representative) to a contractor, 41 
issued after the execution of a construction contract, which authorizes a change to the work being 42 
undertaken and contract time and/or amount.  43 
 44 
 45 
 3 
In this paper, the cost performance of a wide range of infrastructure projects (n=67) completed 46 
between 2011 to 2014 are analyzed and discussed to illustrate the prevailing problem that confronts 47 
the public sector when it opts to use traditional (design-bid-construct) procurement methods or 48 
variants thereof to deliver their assets.   The research presented in this paper provides much needed 49 
empirical evidence for the public sector to re-consider the processes that are used to deliver their 50 
infrastructure assets so as to reduce the propensity of cost overruns occurring and ensure better 51 
value-for-money (VfM) to the taxpayer. 52 
 53 
Cost Performance 54 
For the public sector, managing the cost performance of their portfolio of projects is essential to 55 
ensure taxpayers are being provided with an asset that is able to deliver VfM; this is a critical 56 
metric, as it quantifies the cost efficiency of the work that is completed. Cost performance is 57 
generally defined as the value of the work completed compared to the actual cost of progress made 58 
on the project (Baccarini and Love, 2014). For the public sector, the ability to reliably predict the 59 
final cost of construction of an infrastructure asset whilst ensuring it does not experience a cost 60 
overrun is vital for the planning and resourcing of other projects or those in the pipeline. In this 61 
case, a cost overrun is defined as the ratio of the actual final costs of the project to the estimate 62 
made at full funds authorization measured in escalation-adjusted terms. Thus, a cost overrun is 63 
treated as the margin between the authorized initial project cost and the real final costs incurred 64 
after adjusting for expenditures due to escalation terms.  65 
 66 
Deloitte Access Economics (2014), for example, have revealed that on average, completed 67 
economic infrastructure projects in Australia experience a cost overrun of 6.5% in excess of their 68 
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initial estimate. Moreover, projects in excess of AU$1 billion have been found to experience an 69 
average cost overrun of 12.7%. Higher values have been reported in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) who 70 
examined the cost overruns of 258 transportation projects and revealed a mean cost overrun of 71 
32.8% from the budget established at the decision to build to the completion of construction. 72 
Contrastingly, Love (2002) found that cost overruns from the final tender sum to completion of 73 
construction for a sample 169 projects to possess a mean cost overrun of 12.6%. Terrill and 74 
Danks’s (2016) comprehensive analysis of 836 transportation infrastructure projects valued in 75 
excess of AU$20 million revealed that 90% of the total increase in costs incurred in Australia can 76 
be explained by 17% of projects that exceed their cost by more than 50%. In addition, Terrill and 77 
Danks (2016) revealed that 24% of projects exceeded the cost announced by the incumbent 78 
Government, and 9% were delivered under their publicized budget.   79 
 80 
The disparity between the reported magnitude of cost overruns that have been experienced arises 81 
due to the ‘point of reference’ from where they are determined in a project’s development process 82 
(Siemiatycki, 2009; Love et al. 2016). A review of the literature reveals cost overruns have been 83 
typically determined between the: (1) initial forecasted budget (i.e. base estimate) and actual 84 
construction cost (Cantarelli et al. 2012); (2) detailed planning stage and actual construction costs 85 
(Odeck, 2004); and (3) establishment of a contract value and actual construction costs (Love et al., 86 
2015b).  87 
 88 
These differences, in part, arise as there is a tendency for public infrastructure projects to engage 89 
in a lengthy ‘definition’ period after the decision-to-build and a base estimate has been established. 90 
Needless to say, such a protracted period can result in projects being susceptible to experiencing 91 
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change-orders, which can lead to cost increases being incurred (Allen Consulting and the 92 
University of Melbourne, 2007). With this in mind, it is suggested that it is misleading to make 93 
direct comparisons between the base estimate at the time of the decision-to-build and actual 94 
construction costs, as the estimate that is initially prepared is typically based upon a conceptual 95 
design. As noted in Figure 1, the accuracy of an estimate improves as more information becomes 96 
available (e.g., scope is defined and users’ requirements are identified). In Figure 1, Ashworth’s 97 
(2008) percentage range for each type of estimate that is produced during the design development 98 
phase of a project is presented (p.251).  99 
 100 
At this juncture, it is important to mention that the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) 101 
under the auspices of the ‘New Rules of Measurement’ advocate that all estimates are expressed 102 
as a single figure (RICS, 2012). The use of such a precise figure is failing the basic tests of validity: 103 
accuracy and precision (Newton, 2012). The inadequacies of the traditional estimating process are 104 
camouflaged by the use of deterministic percentage additions that take the form of a contingency, 105 
which cater for an increase in a project’s cost due to: (1) variability (i.e. random uncertainty); (2) 106 
risk events; and (3) unforeseeable situations (Baccarini and Love, 2014). In stark contrast to the 107 
deterministic approach, it has been suggested the application of a probabilistic approach to 108 
determining a construction cost contingency based upon empirical analysis of a wide range of 109 
infrastructure projects should be applied (e.g. Baccarini and Love, 2014).  110 
 111 
Generally, the construction contingency percentages applied to public infrastructure projects have 112 
been unable to accommodate increases in cost that are incurred. For example, Baccarini and Love 113 
(2014) analysis of 228 water infrastructure projects revealed that the mean percentage addition 114 
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was 8.46% of their contract value, but the construction contingency requirement for the final cost 115 
was 13.58%; a shortfall in contingency in the region of 5%. The magnitude of this percentage 116 
addition, while evidently inaccurate, can vary with the nature of the project and the type of 117 
procurement method adopted. For example, in the case of a greenfield project that is being 118 
delivered via a traditional procurement method (e.g., Construct Only), the design and 119 
specifications (including drawings and Bills of Quantities (BoQ)) for a project are supposed to be 120 
complete at the award of a tender and thus a construction contingency between 2% and 5% is often 121 
provided. As a result, there is a perception that a high degree of cost certainty will ensue, but in 122 
reality this is fallacy, as complete drawings and BoQs are seldom available when a project goes to 123 
tender. As previously mentioned, they invariably contain errors and omissions, which can lead to 124 
change-orders and rework and increased construction costs (Love et al., 2012). 125 
 126 
Brownfield projects can be considered to be higher risk ventures than greenfield sites (e.g., due to 127 
geotechnical uncertainties, contaminated soil and neighboring structures). Thus, in the case of 128 
Brownfields projects, a public sector client may opt to use a non-traditional procurement route 129 
(e.g. Design and Construct) and transfer the associated risks for the development to a single-entity 130 
as well as be provided with a Guaranteed Maximum Price, for the works. Any changes in the scope 131 
of work under this form of contractual arrangement, however, will require a client to pay a 132 
premium for any changes that are required. It is, therefore, necessary to have a sufficient 133 
contingency allowance in place should the need for amendments arise (De Marco et al., 2015).  134 
 135 
 136 
Explanations for Deviations in Cost Performance 137 
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The literature is replete with explanations as to ‘how’ and ‘why’ the cost performance of public 138 
sector infrastructure projects deviates from their expected outturn cost (e.g., Pickrell, 1992; Bordat 139 
et al. 2004; Odeck, 2004; Siemiatycki, 2009; Odeck et al., 2015). According to Love et al. (2016) 140 
two schools of thought have emerged explaining deviations in the cost performance of 141 
infrastructure projects: (1) ‘Evolution Theorists’, who have suggested that cost deviations 142 
materialize as a result of changes in scope and definition between a project’s inception and 143 
completion. The Office of the Auditor General in Western Australia (2012), for example, revealed 144 
that changes in scope were the primary culprit that had contributed to cost overruns occurring in 145 
their major capital projects. Next are (2) ‘Psycho Strategists’ who have advocated that projects 146 
experience cost overruns due to deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable optimism bias in 147 
establishing the initial cost targets (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Siemiatycki, 2009). According to 148 
Flyvbjerg (2003) those responsible for determining the budget for an infrastructure project are 149 
often subjected to applying Machiavelli’s formula to ensure it is given approval to proceed: costs 150 
are underestimated (-), revenues are over estimated (+), environmental impacts undervalued (-) 151 
and development effects are overvalued (+) (p.43).  152 
 153 
Often estimators/planners only consider the information that is made available to them for the 154 
particular project they are involved with delivering; such a focus is referred to as having an ‘inside 155 
view’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). In particular, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) observed that “the 156 
inside view is overwhelmingly preferred in intuitive forecasting. The natural way to think about a 157 
problem is to bring to bear all one knows about it, with special attention to its unique features” 158 
(p.26). Contrastingly, an ‘outside view’ recognizes that projects of a similar nature should be used 159 
as a reference point when assessing a project (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). By adopting an 160 
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‘outside view’ Flyvbjerg (2008) suggests that a more realistic forecast of cost can be acquired and 161 
thereby reduce the propensity for optimism bias to arise.   162 
 163 
In theory, the proposition that has been proposed by Flyvbjerg (2008) is plausible, however, in 164 
practice a different reality exists (Love et al., 2016). For example, Perth Arena’s initial budget 165 
estimate was established based on square meter rate with reference to Melbourne Park’s Multi-166 
Purpose Venue (formerly known as Vodafone Stadium and with a construction cost of AU$65 167 
million in 2000). The initial estimate was AU$165 million, which then increased to AU$343 within 168 
two years, and with a final completion cost in excess of AU$550 million (Office of the Auditor 169 
General, 2010).  According to Love et al. (2016) both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ views need to be 170 
adopted to adequately explain the causal nature of cost overruns. However, the research presented 171 
in this paper does not seek to explain ‘why’, but bring to the fore ‘how’ cost overruns occur by 172 
illustrating the direct financial consequences of poorly managed public infrastructure projects. At 173 
the time a project’s contract is signed, cost certainty should be affirmed, unless a form of cost-plus 174 
agreement is otherwise agreed.  175 
 176 
Illustrative Case Study 177 
Most research studies that have examined the cost performance of infrastructure projects have 178 
tended to rely upon heterogeneous datasets (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli et al., 2012).  179 
Such datasets are loosely connected and thus there is a propensity for them to possess a 180 
considerable amount of ‘noise’, as a morass of missing information is adequately needed to explain 181 
the nature of a project’s cost performance (e.g. by way of an asset owners’ aims and objectives, 182 
planning requirements, contractors, project teams, technologies, and contractual arrangements). 183 
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Instead, this research sought to obtain an ameliorated understanding of the impact of change-orders 184 
on the public sector and contractors financial performance.  185 
 186 
To illustrate how the cost performance of infrastructure projects varies and provide an insight to 187 
the problem that confronts the public sector, a case study is used (Fry et al., 1999). Typically, an 188 
illustrative case study is used to describe an event; they utilize one or two instances to demonstrate 189 
the reality of a situation (e.g., change-orders and margin). In this instance, the case study provides 190 
a platform to demonstrate that the cost performance of public sector projects has been mismanaged.  191 
The case study serves to make the ‘unfamiliar, familiar’, and provide a common language for the 192 
nature of infrastructure projects’ cost performance. A homogenous dataset (i.e. in terms of 193 
processes, technologies, procedures and processes) from a contractor who completed a wide range 194 
of infrastructure projects between 2011 to 2014 are examined where their final accounts had been 195 
completed; that is, the final payment made to the contractor on completion of the works described 196 
in the contract and payments owing being made at the end of the defects liability period (typically, 197 
6-12 months after handover). Selecting only those projects that had their final accounts completed 198 
enabled an accurate assessment of their cost to be determined.  No project sampled was subjected 199 
to open tendering, and several were delivered within a Building Information Modelling (BIM) 200 
environment. Individual names, locations, and the Level of Development (LOD) specification of 201 
projects are withheld and the data aggregated for reasons of commercial confidentially. 202 
 203 
 204 
 205 
Analysis and Findings 206 
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Cost data from 67 completed infrastructure projects were provided, which included their 207 
procurement method, original contract value (OCV), final contract value, contractor’s margin, total 208 
of client approved change-orders, and final contractor’s margin. Table 1 provides a summary of 209 
the types and procurement methods for the 67 infrastructure projects that were constructed 210 
throughout Australia within the study period (Table 1). ‘Building’ (n=16, 24%) (e.g., hospitals, 211 
schools and civic assets) and ‘Rail’ (n=16, 24%) and ‘Civil’ (n=22, 33%) (i.e., miscellaneous 212 
works such as dam upgrades and earthworks) were the most popular types of projects that were 213 
constructed. A variety of procurement methods were selected by the public sector to deliver their 214 
assets (Table 1); 65 (44%) were traditional ‘Construct Only’ lump sum contracts and the remainder 215 
being non-traditional methods with the most popular form being ‘Design and Construct’, 216 
(n=13,19%). Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the cost performance parameters of projects 217 
and a breakdown by their type, respectively.   218 
 219 
Cost Performance 220 
The value of the contracts that had been awarded by the public sector varied, though a significant 221 
proportion were less than AU$100 million (n=55, 82%) as denoted in Figure 2. The contract value 222 
of the projects ranged from approximately AU$1.8 million to AU$318 million, with a mean of 223 
AU$48 million (Table 2). More specifically, ‘Civil’, (43%) ‘Building’ (25%) and ‘Rail’ (20%) 224 
project types accounted for a majority of the contractor’s turnover from 2011 to 2014 (Table 3). 225 
 226 
It can be seen that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93% of budget 227 
with a mean cost overrun of 23.75% as a proportion of the OCV. This finding is in stark contrast 228 
to Love (2002) who reported a mean cost overrun of 12.6% of the OCV, with 48% being 229 
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attributable to change-orders and the remaining 52% being due to rework. All projects that utilized 230 
BIM to a minimum of LOD 300 experienced cost increases; in this instance specific model 231 
elements are demonstrated as specific assemblies accurate in terms of quantity, size, shape, 232 
location and orientation.  233 
 234 
A total of 67% (n=45) of projects incurred a cost overrun of less than 25% of the OCV and 9% 235 
(n=6) experienced a cost underrun. A Grubbs test was used to detect outliers from a Normal 236 
Distribution with the tested data being the minimum and maximum values (Grubbs, 1950). The 237 
result is a probability that belongs to the core population being examined. The test is based on the 238 
difference between the mean of the sample the most extreme data considering the standard 239 
deviation is considered. So, if the data is approximately normally distributed, then outliers are 240 
required to have Z-scores ± 3. Outliers possessing a Z-score in the range ± 2 to 3 can be considered 241 
to be ‘borderline’ outliers. As denoted in Figure 3, two projects were identified as being 242 
‘borderline’ with Z-scores being between +2 and +3 and two outright outliers being in excess of 243 
+4. Considering these Z-scores, the ‘best fit’ distribution was determined. Considering the outliers 244 
that were present, a Normal Distribution was not deemed to be the ‘best fit’ distribution’ for the 245 
data.  246 
 247 
The ‘best fit’ probability distribution for ‘cost performance’ was examined so that probability of 248 
cost deviations (i.e., underruns and overrun) could be determined at the point of contract award 249 
(Love et al., 2013); the computation of such a distribution is both pertinent to the public sector and 250 
contractors as part of formulating a risk management strategy for their projects. A caveat, however, 251 
needs to be made here; the data’s homogeneity would likely provide a more accurate assessment 252 
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of risk for the contractor, but could provide public sector clients with ‘ballpark’ probabilities to 253 
formulate future construction contingencies. ‘Underruns’ and ‘overruns’ should be separated when 254 
examining cost performance, but considering the limited number of projects that were below the 255 
agreed contract value it was decided to combine them together in this case.   256 
 257 
Using the ‘Goodness of Fit’ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D), and Anderson-Darling (A2) tests it was 258 
revealed that Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution with parameters k = 0.51, σ = 11.98, 259 
μ = 4.43 was identified as the ‘best fit’ solution for examining the cost performance for the sample 260 
of projects.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test revealed a D statistic of 0.13204 with a P-value 261 
of 0.17669. The Anderson-Darling (A-D) statistic A2 was revealed to be 5.2189. The K-S test 262 
accepted the Null Hypothesis (i.e., H0 where it is assumed that there is no difference in parameters) 263 
for the sample distribution’s ‘best fit’ at the critical nominated α values of 0.2, and at 0.01 for the 264 
A-D test. The resulting GEV probability density function (PDF) is expressed as: 265 
 266 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = �1𝜎𝜎 exp (−(1 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)−1𝑘𝑘)(1 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)−1−1𝑘𝑘  𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0
1
𝜎𝜎
exp(−𝑘𝑘 − exp(−𝑘𝑘))   𝑘𝑘 = 0      [Eq.1] 267 
 268 
 269 
where z=(x-μ)/σ, and k, σ, μ are the shape, scale, and location parameters respectively. The scale 270 
must be positive (sigma>0), the shape and location can take on any real value. However, the range 271 
of definition for the GEV distribution depends on k:  272 
 273 
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1 + 𝑘𝑘 (𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇)𝜎𝜎 > 0   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0 
−∞ < 𝑥𝑥 < +∞    𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑘𝑘 = 0  274 
            [Eq.2] 275 
 276 
Using the GEV PDF the probability of cost overrun of 23.75% is 73% (P=0.73). The proportion 277 
of projects (67%) that experienced less than 25% cost overrun had a mean of 7.9%; the probability 278 
a project exceeds its OCV is 0.58%. 279 
 280 
The detailed financial summaries provided to the researchers by the contractor revealed that client 281 
change-orders contributed to the cost deviations that were subjected to public sector clients’ 282 
approval. Non-conformances also materialized in the projects, but the rectification costs did not 283 
impact the final contract value paid by the clients as these were the responsibility of the 284 
subcontractors and suppliers. 285 
 286 
The correlation analysis presented in Table 4 reveals that the size of a project in terms of its OCV, 287 
its type, and the procurement method used were not significantly related with cost performance (p 288 
<0.01). Studies examining the relationship between project size and the extent of cost overrun that 289 
is incurred remains inconclusive and has been the subject of debate (e.g., Odeck, 2004; Love et 290 
al., 2013). In pursuing this unresolved issue, the analysis sought to determine if there was a 291 
significant difference between a project’s size (i.e. OCV) and cost performance. A one-way 292 
Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) was used in this instance to test for differences. Levene’s test 293 
for homogeneity of variances was not found to be violated (p <0.05), which indicates the 294 
population variances for project size and cost performance were equal. Thus, there were no 295 
significant differences between ‘project size’ and cost performance, F (4,62) = 1.096, p <0.05). 296 
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Furthermore, to determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and cost 297 
performance, a t-test was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’. 298 
Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized 299 
procurement types, and the results of the t-test are presented in Table 6. At the 95% confidence 300 
interval, no significant difference in cost performance was experienced in projects delivered under 301 
the different procurement categorizations that were established. Akin with previous research it can 302 
be concluded that cost performance does not significantly vary with the procurement methods 303 
employed (e.g., Love, 2002). 304 
 305 
Change-Orders 306 
The mean amount of client approved change-orders that occurred in projects was approximately 307 
AU$5.1 million (10.6%) (Table 2). In addition, the total change-orders accounted for 11% of the 308 
value of the work that was undertaken by the contractor between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3). To 309 
determine if there was a significant difference between the change-orders and project size an 310 
ANOVA was undertaken. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was found to be violated (p 311 
= 0.00), which indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were not 312 
equal. Significant differences between change-orders and project size were found to occur, F 313 
(4,62) = 5.525, p <0.01). A Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tested showed that projects with lower a OCV 314 
experienced smaller volumes of change-orders (p <0.05). 315 
Margin 316 
According to the NAO (2013) there is limited available knowledge and a lack of transparency 317 
surrounding the margins of contractors. In contributing to this gap in knowledge, the analysis 318 
revealed that the contractor’s mean margin (excluding overheads) was 9.89% of the OCV. Table 319 
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3 provides a breakdown of the mean margin allocated for each type of project, which ranged from 320 
8.76% to 10.61%.  321 
 322 
The lowest record margin was 3.98% of the OCV for a ‘Civil’ project that had an OCV of AU$48.4 323 
million and a final contract value of AU$65.9 million. However, in this project the contractor’s 324 
expected margin at the commencement of the works was AU$3.8 million, but declined to AU$3.2 325 
million (-15.57%) due to issues surrounding rework, which they were accountable for. This 326 
scenario was observed in several projects, for example, a AU$64.7 million ‘Construct Only’ 327 
‘Civil’ project that had an expected margin of AU$2.9 million. With the client issuing scope 328 
changes, the final contract value was AU$61.6 million, a cost underrun of 4.06%. The contractor 329 
experienced a staggering loss of AU$38.2 million, which occurred due to an array of issues that 330 
included rework, product non-conformances and delays to works (Table 2).  Disastrous projects 331 
of this nature can, and more often than not, usually result in contractors being liquidated. If, 332 
however, as in this case, they are able to shoulder such costs, then their stock value, reputation and 333 
image within the public and private sectors and the general community can be adversely impacted.  334 
Losses in one project can be offset against gains in others that form part of a contractor’s portfolio 335 
of work in progress. For example, the maximum recorded final margin as noted in Table 2 was 336 
AU$80.18 million for a project that had an OCV in excess of AU$1 billion and incurred a cost 337 
increase of 7.5%. 338 
The project that had the highest margin (> 30%) was a ‘Building’ project with an OCV of AU$3.38 339 
million, which increased by 25.76% in value to AU$4.87 million due to change-orders. In contrast 340 
to the aforementioned example, this project’s margin increased from an expected value of 341 
AU$641,608 to AU$1.37 million (114.33%).  Surprisingly, the projects with margins in excess of 342 
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20% of their OCV varied in size, type, and location. Figure 4 identifies three ‘borderline’ and two 343 
‘outlier’ projects that possessed high margins. For example, a ‘Civil’ project had an OCV of $138 344 
million with a margin of 22.82%. Conversely, a ‘Building’ project had an OCV of AU$2.5 million 345 
with a margin of 28.98%.  346 
 347 
Considering the prevailing ‘outliers’ the ‘best fit’ distribution was computed, and can ceteris 348 
paribus be used to determine the likelihood of a contractor’s margin by the public sector. As above, 349 
the K-S and A-D ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were undertaken. The results of the ‘Goodness of Fit’ 350 
tests revealed that the Wakeby distribution provided the ‘best fit’ for the dataset.  The K-S test 351 
revealed a D-statistic of 0.07573 with a P-value of 0.80413 and the A-D statistic A2 was revealed 352 
to be 0.47668 at the critical nominated α values of 0.01.   The Wakeby is a form of GEV 353 
distribution.  The parameters of a Wakeby, α β γ δ ξ are all continuous.  The domain for this 354 
distribution is expressed as , if  and ,  if  or . The 355 
distribution parameters for the range were α = 21.367, β = 4.5569, γ = 1.71, δ =0.45437, ξ=3.0078.   356 
The Wakeby distribution is defined by the quantile function (i.e. inverse CDF): 357 
 358 
       [Eq.3] 359 
 360 
The Wakeby PDF is used to determine the likelihood of a mean of 9.89% margin if applied to a 361 
project; in this instance, there is a 62% (P=0.62) probability that this margin would be applied. 362 
 363 
x≤ξ ≥δ 0>γ δγβαξ −+≤≤ x 0<δ 0=γ
( )( ) ( )( )δβ
δ
γ
β
αξ −−−−−−+= FFFx 1111)(
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The mean margin OCV contract award for various sizes of projects can be seen in Table 7. It can 364 
be seen the mean margins do not significantly vary between one and another rendering the Wakeby 365 
distribution identified above as a basis for determining the likely margin that would be applied. 366 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances confirms this observation as it was not found to be 367 
violated (p <0.05), which indicates the population variances for project size and margin are equal. 368 
Thus, there were no significant differences between ‘project size’ and margin, F (4,62) = 3.04., p 369 
<0.05). A significant association, however, was found to be present with the percentage increase 370 
of the final margin with project size, r=-038, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails and cost performance and 371 
r=-046, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails. It can be therefore implied that the likelihood of an increase in 372 
expected margin at contract decreases with smaller OCVs. In addition, the margins of a contractor 373 
increase as a project experiences larger cost overruns. 374 
 375 
To determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and margin, a t-test 376 
was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’. Table 8 presents the 377 
mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized procurement types, and the 378 
results of the t-test are presented in Table 9. At the 95% confidence interval, no significant 379 
difference in margins was determined under the different procurement categorizations that were 380 
established.  381 
 382 
The dominant paradigm within the public sector assumes that differing procurement options can 383 
provide varying degrees of cost certainty and will influence the level of a contractor’s margin, 384 
which is a reflection of their risk profile; the findings presented from this illustrative case study 385 
suggest the contrary, and provide a basis for the public sector to better understand the unintended 386 
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consequences of change-orders that can arise during the delivery of their assets.  The level of a 387 
contractor’s margin is a small component of their cost, yet having an understanding of this amount 388 
is important, as the balance of risk and reward can distort their behavior if they are not aligned 389 
(Love et al., 2011). Thus, the balance of risk and reward is dependent upon the structure of the 390 
contract and how well it is managed (NAO, 2013).  391 
 392 
Discussion 393 
What matters most to the taxpayer is whether contracted out services can provide improved quality 394 
at an appropriate overall cost (NAO, 2013: p.15). Taxpayers concerns, however, are not being 395 
adequately addressed; evidence of this can be seen with the sheer number of public sector projects 396 
that have and continue to experience cost overruns. This is not to say that the public sector is 397 
neglecting such concerns; quite the contrary, as it is acknowledged that significant effort has been 398 
undertaken to redress the issues that adversely impact the delivery of infrastructure projects. After 399 
all public-sector employees are also taxpayers and therefore there should be a resounding 400 
motivation for them to ensure assets and services are delivered, operated and maintained cost 401 
effectively. However, despite noble intentions, there is a residing suspicion that spending other 402 
peoples’ money on other people absolves them from any form of accountability, which often 403 
results in assets not providing the VfM that was initially intended.  This case in point was originally 404 
highlighted by Milton Friedman (2004) who perceptively stated: “I can spend somebody else's 405 
money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else's money on somebody else, I'm not 406 
concerned about how much it is, and I'm not concerned about what I get. And that's government”. 407 
 408 
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The magnitude of change-orders that occurs in projects is troublesome and hinders public sector 409 
ability to cost effectively ensure the asset being delivered is ‘future proofed’; that is, resilient to 410 
unexpected events and adaptable to changing needs, uses or capacities. Changes during 411 
construction may lead to sub-optimal solutions (e.g., design, functionality, materials, running 412 
costs) being incorporated into an asset’s fabric to minimize cost and meet the committed 413 
completion date.  414 
 415 
Irrespective of the procurement strategy adopted, change-orders were found to materialize during 416 
construction. An analysis of the nature of change-orders is outside the remit of this paper, but it 417 
was observed that changes in scope, and errors and omissions in documentation predominated. 418 
Such levels of change indicate that the ‘design’ process has not been effectively managed, 419 
irrespective of the procurement option, and the use of BIM, though as noted this was only used in 420 
a limited number of projects. The authors did not have access to the construction contingency of 421 
the public-sector clients, but a deterministic figure between 2% and 5% (Baccarini and Love 2014), 422 
which is often applied would have obviously been inadequate for the sampled projects. Prior to 423 
the commencement of construction, a contingency in excess of this value would be unacceptable 424 
for the public sector as there is unequivocally a need for cost certainty. But, there remains the 425 
‘elephant in the room’, with no party wanting to be held accountable for contributing to the 426 
development and production of an incomplete scope and poor quality tender documentation. 427 
Naturally, contractors will submit a bid based upon the information that they have been provided 428 
and may opportunistically price items within the BoQ where they anticipate future changes to 429 
materialize to maximize their margin.  430 
 431 
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In light of the status quo, cost overruns due to change-orders will continue to prevail and could 432 
even be exacerbated as there is a misconception that digitization of the design process enabled by 433 
the use of BIM will reduce errors and omissions. Simply superimposing a 21st century innovation 434 
such as BIM to procurement practices where contracts do not wholly support collaborative working 435 
and have been essentially developed for the 20th century, will not leverage the benefits that can be 436 
afforded from its adoption. Thus, to mitigate change-orders, behavioral, cultural, legal and 437 
structural issues associated with the delivery of public sector assets need to be transformed to 438 
effectively accommodate the benefits that can be afforded by BIM, especially if they are to be 439 
future-proofed. The inclusion of contractors and asset managers in the design process is needed to 440 
help reduce changes using visualization and enable future-proofing to take place (Figure 5). This 441 
can be done by ensuring the information needed to effectively operate and maintain an asset is 442 
captured and provided in a usable format that is readily accessible (Figure 6).  443 
 444 
Considerable effort has been and continues to be made to address the aforementioned issues to 445 
support the digitization of assets throughout their life-cycle, particularly in the United Kingdom 446 
(e.g. Construction Industry Council, 2014). While such efforts provide the building blocks for 447 
enabling the much-needed transformational change, many public-sector agencies are still ‘sitting 448 
on the fence’ with regard to rolling out BIM and implementing the new procurement practices that 449 
are required, despite being cognizant of the problems associated with existing approaches of asset 450 
delivery. Indeed, this is a bold proposition, however, if the public sector is to make headway in 451 
ensuring that assets are delivered cost effectively, then a charter focusing on procurement reform 452 
needs to be initiated, managed and maintained; changes initiated in the past have been ephemeral.    453 
 454 
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Conclusion 455 
Public infrastructure projects that experience cost overruns adversely impact taxpayers. It is 456 
therefore imperative that they are not only delivered within budget but also continue to be of 457 
value into the future. Providing infrastructure that is resilient and adaptable to changing needs, 458 
capacities and uses should be the ultimate goal of the public sector. The path to attaining this goal 459 
can be derailed when change-orders (e.g., in scope) are required during construction, and can lead 460 
to sub-optimal assets being delivered. The taxpayer pays for this additional cost, while contractors 461 
are rewarded with an increase in their margins; this is the ‘elephant in the room’ within the public 462 
sector, which is underpinned by ‘spending somebody else's money on somebody else’.  463 
 464 
In examining the cost performance of public infrastructure projects an illustrative case study was 465 
undertaken. Cost information from 67 projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 were provided 466 
by a contracting organization. The cost overruns/underruns that were experienced were calculated 467 
from the contract award to when final accounts were completed. The analysis revealed that the 468 
cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93%, with a mean cost overrun of 469 
23.75%. and a probability of occurring of 73%. In alignment with previous research no significant 470 
differences in the magnitude of cost overruns were found to exist by a project’s contract value, 471 
types, and procurement method. It revealed that change-orders accounted for a significant 472 
proportion of the cost overruns that emerged in the projects, with a mean of 10.6% as a proportion 473 
of the original contract value. Notably, significant differences were found to occur between a 474 
project’s size and change-orders; that is, those with a smaller original contract value experienced 475 
a smaller volume of change-orders. 476 
 477 
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Limited knowledge has existed about the margins that contractors apply to projects. However, the 478 
mean margin applied to the sample of public sector projects was revealed to be 9.89%, and the 479 
likelihood of such a value being applied was computed to be 62%.  The analysis revealed that the 480 
margin applied by the contractor did not vary with project type, its size and the procurement 481 
method being used to construct the asset. The analysis also demonstrated a positive association 482 
with an increase in change-orders and the contractor’s margin. More specifically it was found that 483 
contractor’s margins increase with larger cost overruns. A significant proportion of the projects 484 
were delivered using traditional ‘Construct Only’ and there is no incentive for contractors reduce 485 
change-orders as they have had no involvement in the design process. Even when the contractor 486 
was involved in the design process, change-orders still occurred, though their extent was unable 487 
to be determined.  488 
 489 
Involving the contractor as early as possible in the design process, providing incentives, and open-490 
book tendering are considerations that should be enacted as initial steps to mitigate change-orders. 491 
As the public sector embraces the era of digitization, which is being enabled by Building 492 
Information Modelling, the need to integrate design and construction and engender collaboration 493 
is imperative to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and future-proofed. Emphasis here 494 
should not necessarily be placed on the technology but ensuring information is structured in a 495 
standardized format, captured, openly-shared, stored and accessible so that parties can effectively 496 
work in a collaborative environment. The research in this paper provides invaluable empirical 497 
evidence, though based on a limited dataset of 67 projects, to support the need for a change to the 498 
way the public sector procures their assets. If change is not embraced, then cost overruns will 499 
continue to be a nemesis.  500 
 23 
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Figure 1. Traditional cost scenario for infrastructure projects 616 
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Figure 2. Number of infrastructure projects 625 
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Figure 3. Determination of outliers for cost performance 632 
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Figure 4. Determination of outliers for margin 653 
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(a) A 3D visualization of what is to be constructed (b) Actually constructed 
  
Figure 5.  3D visualization 668 
 669 
  670 
Figure 6. Centralization of asset information for operations and maintenance 671 
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Table 1. Projects and procurement methods 675 
= 676 
Procurement Method  
 Construct 
Only 
Design 
and 
Construct 
Service 
Contract 
Alliance Construction 
Management 
Management 
Contracting 
EPC 
Project 
Type 
N (%) N (%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) 
Rail 13(33) 2(15) 1(100) 1(100)     
Road 2(5) 1(7.5)      
Tunnel 3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Civil 13(30) 4(30)    1(33) 3(100) 
Building 10(25) 2(15)   2 (5) 2(67)  
Power  3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Water  1(2.5) 2(15)      
Total 44 (100) 13(100) 1(100) 1(100) 2(100) 3 (100) 3(100) 
677 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for cost performance parameters 678 
 679 
Cost Parameter Minimum   Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Original Contract 
Value (OCV) $1,851,459 $318,307,311 $48,201,497 $58,619,500 
Cost Performance -42.88% 270.93% 23.75% 48.51% 
Final Contract 
Value $3,334,068 $453,869,568 $59,501,002 $81,674,335 
Original Margin $224,496 $31,543,968 $4,431,586 $6,278,123 
Final Margin $-38,204,212 $80,188,944** $6,171,254 $14,305,630 
Client Approved 
Change-Orders $-519,141.62 $80,655,072.00 $5,107,252 $11,364,666 
 680 
** Specific details are suppressed due to reasons of commercial in confidence. Similarly, this applies to the location of all projects  681 
 682 
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Table 3. Original contract values and approved change orders 703 
 704 
 705 
Project 
Type  
N Total value of 
projects ($) 
OCV 
Minimum 
Value ($) 
OCV 
Maximum 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Margin (%) 
Total Client Approved 
Change Orders ($) 
Rail  16 645,736,621 1,851,459 318,307,311 40,358,538 8.76 57,710,882 
Road  2 47,145,336 8,822,453 38,322,883 23,572,668 10.48 4,290 
Tunnel  4 230,234,197 30,179,736 102,465,401 57,558,549 10.61 23,244,545 
Civil  22 1.39E+9 4,970,945 224,575,457 63,0323,333 10.17 207,114,979 
Building  16 823,883,239 2,258,943 180,049,561 51,492,702 10.41 46,791,411 
Power  4 488,534,403 4,519,860 200,825,529 12,213,350 9.89 4,185,061 
Water  3 46,936,231 4,611,781 23,396,953 15,645,410 9.60 3,134,747 
Total 67 3.23E+9 1,851,459 318,307,311 48,201,497 9.89 342,185,917 
 706 
  707 
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Table 4. Correlations between project characteristics and cost measures 708 
Variable Project Type 
Procurement 
Method 
Project 
Size 
Cost 
Performance 
% 
Original 
Margin 
% Final 
Margin to 
OCV 
Project Type 1      
Procurement Method 0.114 1     
Project Size 0.065 0.218 1    
Cost Performance -0.113 0.157 -0.057 1   
% of Margin of OCV 
0.079 0.111 -0.013 0.207 1  
% of Final Margin to 
OCV 
-0.24 -0.111 -.389** .462** -0.049 1 
       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
 709 
 710 
 711 
 712 
 713 
 714 
 715 
 716 
 717 
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Table 5. Cost performance for procurement types 721 
 722 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 18.1933 45.81480 6.90684 
Non-traditional 23 35.8728 53.43433 11.39224 
 723 
 724 
Table 6. t-test for difference between cost performance and procurement types 725 
 726 
 Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.537 0.466 -1.398 65 0.167 -17.679 12.650 -42.951 7.592 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -1.327 36.844 0.193 -17.679 13.322 -44.677 9.318 
 727 
 728 
 729 
 730 
 731 
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Table 7. Size and margin % of contract value 732 
Project Size N Mean (%) Minimum (%)  Maximum 
(%) 
Std. Deviation 
$1-$20m 28 10.26 3.98 32.33 6.15 
$21-$50m 17 8.54 0.00 26.41 5.79 
$51-$100m 10 10.60 4.01 26.62 6.69 
$101-$200m 10 10.32 6.17 22.82 4.81 
>$201m 2 9.91 9.91 10.04 0.91 
Total 67 9.89 0.00 32.33 5.79 
 733 
 734 
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 736 
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Table 8. Margin for procurement types 743 
 744 
 745 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 9.568 5.501 0.829 
Non-traditional 23 10.61 6.529 1.392 
 746 
 747 
Table 9. t-test for difference between contractor’s margin and procurement types 748 
 749 
 Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.329 0.568 -0.682 65 0.498 -1.042 1.529 -4.098 2.013 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -0.644 36.318 0.524 -1.042 1.620 -4.328 2,242 
 750 
 751 
 752 
